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ABSTRACT
We propose detection of deepfake videos based on the dissimilarity
between the audio and visual modalities, termed as theModality
Dissonance Score (MDS). We hypothesize that manipulation of
either modality will lead to dis-harmony between the two modali-
ties, e.g., loss of lip-sync, unnatural facial and lip movements, etc.
MDS is computed as an aggregate of dissimilarity scores between
audio and visual segments in a video. Discriminative features are
learnt for the audio and visual channels in a chunk-wise manner,
employing the cross-entropy loss for individual modalities, and a
contrastive loss that models inter-modality similarity. Extensive
experiments on the DFDC and DeepFake-TIMIT Datasets show
that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art by up to 7%. We
also demonstrate temporal forgery localization, and show how our
technique identifies the manipulated video segments.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The combination of ubiquitous multimedia and high performance
computing resources has inspired numerous efforts to manipulate
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audio-visual content for both benign and sinister purposes. Re-
cently, there has been a lot of interest in the creation and detection
of high-quality videos containing facial and auditory manipulations,
popularly known as deepfakes [5, 11]. Since fake videos are often in-
distinguishable from genuine counterparts, detection of deepfakes
is challenging but topical given their potential for denigration and
defamation, especially against women and in propagating misin-
formation [6, 27].
Part of the challenge in detecting deepfakes via artifical intel-
ligence (AI) approaches is that deepfakes are themselves created
via AI techniques. Neural network-based architectures like Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks (GANs) [7] and Autoencoders [25] are
used for generating fake media content, and due to their ‘learnable’
nature, output deepfakes become more naturalistic and adept at
cheating fake detection methods over time. Improved deepfakes
necessitate novel fake detection (FD) solutions; FD methods have
primarily looked at frame-level visual features [19] for statistical
inconsistencies, but temporal characteristics [9] have also been
examined of late. Recently, researchers have induced audio-based
manipulations to generate fake content, and therefore, corruptions
can occur in both the visual and audio channels.
Deepfakes tend to be characterized by visual inconsistencies such
as a lack of lip-sync, unnatural facial and lip appearance/movements
or assymmetry between facial regions such as the left and right
eyes (see Fig. 5 for an example). Such artifacts tend to capture user
attention. Authors of [8] performed a psycho-physical experiment
to study the effect of dissonance, i.e., lack of sync between the
audio and visual channels on user attention and memory. Three
different versions of four TV news stories were shown to users, one
having perfect audio-visual sync, a second with some asynchrony,
and a third with no sync. The study concluded that out-of-sync
or dissonant audio-visual channels induced a high user cognitive
load, while in-sync audio and video (no dissonance condition) were
perceived as a single stimulus as they ‘belonged together’.
We adopt the dissonance rationale for deepfake detection, and
since a fake video would contain either an altered audio or visual
channel, one can expect higher audio-visual dissonance for fake
videos than for real ones. We measure the audio-visual dissonance
in a video via theModality Dissonance Score (MDS), and use this
metric to label it as real/fake. Specifically, audio-visual dissimilarity
is computed over 1-second video chunks to perform a fine-grained
analysis, and then aggregated over all chunks for deriving MDS,
employed as figure-of-merit for video labeling.
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MDS is modeled based on the contrastive loss, which has tradi-
tionally been employed for discovering lip-sync issues in video [3].
Contrastive loss enforces the video and audio features to be closer
for real videos, and farther for fake ones. Our method also works
with videos involving only the audio/visual channel as our neu-
ral network architecture includes the video and audio-specific
sub-networks, which seek to independently learn discriminative
real/fake features via the imposition of a cross-entropy loss. Ex-
perimental results confirm that these unimodal loss functions fa-
cilitate better real-fake discriminability over modeling only the
contrastive loss. Experiments on the DFDC [5] and DF-TIMIT [21]
datasets show that our technique outperforms the state-of-the-art
by upto 7%, which we attribute to the following factors: (1) Mod-
eling unimodal losses in addition to the contrastive loss which
measures modality dissonance, and (2) Learning discriminative
features by comparing 1-second audio-visual chunks to compute
MDS, as against directly learning video-level features. Chunk-wise
learning also enables localization of transient video forgeries (i.e.,
where only some frames in a sequence are corrupted), while past
works have only focused on the real-fake labeling problem.
The key contributions of our work are: (a) We propose a novel
multimodal framework for deepfake video detection based onmodal-
ity dissonance computed over small temporal segments; (b) To our
knowledge, our method is the first to achieve temporal forgery
localization, and (c) Our method achieves state-of-art results on the
DFDC dataset, improving AUC score by up to 7%.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to de-
tecting fake multimedia content automatically and efficiently. Most
video faking methods focus on manipulating the video modality;
audio-based manipulation is relatively rare. Techniques typically
employed for generating fake visual content include 3D face mod-
eling, computer graphics-based image rendering, GAN-based face
image synthesis, image warping, etc. Artifacts are synthesized ei-
ther via face swapping while keeping the expressions intact (e.g.,
DeepFakes1, FaceSwap2) or via facial expression transfer, i.e., fa-
cial reenactment (e.g., Face2Face [24]). Approaches for fake video
detection can be broadly divided into three categories as follows:
2.1 Image-based
These methods employ image/frame-based statistical inconsisten-
cies for real/fake classification. For example, [15] uses visual ar-
tifacts such as missing reflections and incomplete details in the
eye and teeth regions, inconsistent illumination and heterogeneous
eye colours as cues for fake detection. Similarly, [28] relies on the
hypothesis that the 3-D head pose generated using the entire face’s
landmark points will be very different from the one computed using
only the central facial landmarks, in case the face is synthetically
generated. Authors of [13] hypothesize that fake videos contain
artifacts due to resolution inconsistency between the warped face
region (which is usually blurred) and surrounding context, andmod-
els the same via the VGG and ResNet deep network architectures. A
1https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
2https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
capsule network architecture is proposed in [19] for detecting vari-
ous kinds of spoofs, such as video replays with embedded images
and computer-generated videos.
A multi-task learning framework for fake detection-cum-
segmentation of manipulated image (or video frame) regions is
presented in [18]. It is based on a convolutional neural network,
comprising an encoder and a Y-shaped decoder, where informa-
tion gained by one of the detection/segmentation tasks is shared
with the other so as to benefit both tasks. A two-stream network
is proposed in [30], which leverages information from local noise
residuals and camera characteristics. It employs a GoogLeNet-based
architecture for one stream, and a patch based triplet network as
second stream. Authors of [1] train a CNN, named MesoNet, to clas-
sify real and fake faces generated by the DeepFake and Face2face
techniques. Given the similar nature of falsifications achieved by
these methods, identical network structures are trained for both
problems by focusing on mesoscopic properties (intermediate-level
analysis) of images.
2.2 Video-based
Video-based fake detection methods also use temporal features for
classification, since many a time, deepfake videos contain realistic
frames but the warping used for manipulation is temporally incon-
sistent. For instance, variations in eye-blinking patterns are utilized
in [12] to determine real and fake videos. Correlations between
different pairs of facial action units across frames are employed for
forgery detection in [2]. Authors of [9] extract frame-level CNN
features, and use them to train a recurrent neural network for
manipulation detection.
2.3 Audio-visual features based
Aforementioned approaches exploit only the visual modality for
identifying deepfake videos. However, examining other modalities
such as audio signal in addition to the video can also be helpful.
As an example, authors of [16] propose a Siamese network-based
approach, which compares the multimedia as well as emotion-
based differences in facial movements and speech patterns to learn
differences between real and fake videos. Lip-sync detection in
unconstrained settings is achieved by learning the closeness between
the audio and visual channels for in-sync vs out-of-sync videos
via contrastive loss modeling in [3]. While this technique is not
meant to address deep-fake detection per se, lip-sync issues can also
be noted from a careful examination of deepfake videos, and the
contrastive loss is useful for tying up genuine audio-visual pairs.
2.4 Bimodal Approaches
While it may be natural to see audio and video as the two main
information modes that indicate the genuineness/fakeness of a
video, one can also employ multiple cues from the visual modality
for identifying fake videos. Multimodal cues are especially useful
while tackling sophisticated visual manipulations. In [9], both intra-
frame and inter-frame visual consistencies are modeled by feeding
in frame-level CNN features to train a recurrent neural network.
Statistical differences between the warped face area and the sur-
rounding regions are learned via the VGG and ResNet architectures
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in [13]. Hierarchical relations in image (video frame) content are
learned via a Capsule Network architecture in [19].
2.5 Analysis of Related Work
Upon examining related literature, we make the following remarks
to situate our work with respect to existing works.
1. While frame-based methods that learn spatial inconsisten-
cies have been proposed to detect deepfakes, temporal-based
approaches are conceivably more powerful to this end, as
even if the manipulation looks natural in a static image,
achieving temporally consistent warping even over a few
seconds of video is difficult. Our approach models temporal
characteristics, as we consider 1-second long audio-visual
segments to distinguish between real and fake videos. Learn-
ing over tiny video chunks allows for a fine-grained examina-
tion of temporal differences, and also enables our method to
temporally localize manipulation in cases where the forgery
targets only a small portion of the video. To our knowledge,
prior works have only focused on assigning a real/fake video
label.
2. Very few approaches have addressed deepfake detection
where the audio/video stream may be corrupted. In this
regard, two works very related to ours are [3] and [16]. In [3],
the contrastive loss function is utilized to enforce a smaller
distance between lip-synced audio-visual counterparts; our
work represents a novel application of the contrastive loss,
employed for lip-sync detection in [3], to deepfake detection.
Additionally, we show that learning audio-visual dissonance
over small chunks and aggregating these measures over the
video duration is more beneficial than directly learning video-
level features.
3. Both multimedia and emotional audio-visual features are
learned for FD in [16]. We differ from [16] in three respects:
(a) While we do not explicitly learn emotional audio-visual
coherence, forged videos need not be emotional in nature;
audio-visual consistency is enforced via the contrastive loss
in our approach. (b) The training framework in [16] requires
a real–fake video pair. Our approach does not constrain the
training process to involve video-pairs, and adopts the tradi-
tional training protocol. (c) Whilst [16] perform a video-level
comparison of audio-visual features to model dissonance, we
compare smaller chunks and aggregate chunk-wisemeasures
to obtain the MDS. This enables our approach to localize
transient forgeries.
4. Given that existing datasets primarily involve visual manipu-
lations (number of datasets do not have an audio component),
our architecture also includes audio and visual sub-networks
which are designed to learn discriminative unimodal fea-
tures via the cross-entropy loss. Our experiments show that
additionally including the cross-entropy loss is more benefi-
cial than employing only the contrastive loss. Enforcing the
two losses in conjunction enables our approach to achieve
state-of-the-art performance on the DFDC dataset.
3 MDS-BASED FAKE VIDEO DETECTION
As discussed in Section 1, our FD technique is based on the hy-
pothesis that deepfake videos have higher dissonance between the
audio and visual streams as compared to real videos. The dissimi-
larity between the audio and visual channels for a real/fake video
is obtained via the Modality Dissonance Score (MDS), which is
obtained as the aggregate dissimilarity computed over 1-second
visual-audio chunks. In addition, our network enforces learning of
discriminative visual and auditory features even if the contrastive
loss is not part of the learning objective; this enables FD even if the
input video is missing the audio/visual modality, in which case the
contrastive loss is not computable. A description of our network
architecture for MDS-based deepfake detection follows.
3.1 Overview
Given an input video, our aim is to classify it as real or fake. We
begin with a training dataset D = {(v1,y1), (v2,y2), ..., (vN ,yN )}
consisting of N videos. Here, vi denotes the input video and the
label yi ϵ {0, 1} indicates whether the video is real (yi = 0) or fake
(yi = 1). The training procedure is depicted in Fig. 1. We extract
the audio signal from input video vi using the ffmpeg library, and
split it into D-second segments. Likewise for the visual modality,
we divide the input video into D-second long segments, and per-
form face tracking on these video segments using the S3FD face
detector [29] to extract the face crops. This pre-processing gives us
segments of visual frames {si1, si2, ..., sin } along with corresponding
audio segments {ai1,ai2, ...,ain }, where n denotes segment count for
an input video vi .
We employ a bi-stream network, comprising the audio and video
streams, for deepfake detection. Each video segment sit , t = 1 . . .n
is passed through a visual stream Sv , and the corresponding audio
segment ait is passed through the audio stream Sa . These streams
are described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The network is trained using
a combination of the contrastive loss and the cross-entropy loss. The
contrastive loss is meant to tie up the audio and visual streams; it
ensures that the video and audio streams are closer for real videos,
and farther for fake videos. Consequently, one can expect a low
MDS for real, and high MDS for fake videos. If either the audio
or visual stream is missing in the input video, in which case the
contrastive loss is not computable, the video and audio streams will
still learn discriminative features as constrained by the unimodal
cross-entropy losses. These loss functions are described in Sec. 3.4.
3.2 Visual Stream
The input to the visual stream is sit , a video sequence of size (3×h×
w ×D ∗ f ), where 3 refers to the RGB color channels of each frame,
h,w are the frame height and width, D is the segment length in sec-
onds, and f is the video frame rate. Table 1 depicts the architecture
of the video and audio sub-networks. The visual stream (Sv ) archi-
tecture is inspired by the 3D-ResNet similar to [10]. 3D-CNNs have
been widely used for action recognition in videos, and ResNet is
one of the most popular architectures for image classification. The
feature representation learnt by the visual stream, in particular the
fc8 output, denoted by fv is used to compute the contrastive loss.
We also add a 2-neuron classification layer at the end of this stream,
which outputs the visual-based prediction label. So the output of
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Komal Chugh, Parul Gupta, Abhinav Dhall, and Ramanathan Subramanian
Face
Detection
....
....
MFCC
features
Contrastive Loss (L1)
Cross-Entropy Loss
(L2)
Cross-Entropy Loss
(L3)
Final Loss
segment-2segment-1 segment-n
audio	segment-1
fc7 fc8
fc7 fc8
video segment-level
features
audio	segment-2 audio	segment-n
audio segment-level
features
Figure 1: MDS-based fake video detection: Features extracted from 1-second audio-visual segments are input to the MDS net-
work. The MDS network comprises the audio and visual sub-networks, whose description is provided in Table 1. Descriptors
learned by the video and audio sub-networks are tuned via the cross-entropy loss, while the contrastive loss is employed to
enforce higher dissimilarity between audio-visual chunks arising from fake videos. MDS is computed as the aggregate audio-
visual dissonance over the video length, and employed as a figure of merit for labeling a video as real/fake.
this stream, labeled as yˆiv , constitutes the unimodal cross-entropy
loss.
3.3 Audio Stream
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) features are input to
the audio stream. MFCC features [17] are widely used for speaker
and speech recognition [14], and have been the state-of-the-art for
over three decades. For each audio segment ofD second duration ait ,
MFCC values are computed and passed through the audio stream Sa .
13 mel frequency bands are used at each time step. Overall, audio is
encoded as a heat-map image representing MFCC values for each
time step and each mel frequency band. We base the audio stream
architecture on convolutional neural networks designed for image
recognition. Contrastive loss L1 uses the output of fc8, denoted by
fa . Similar to the visual stream, we add a classification layer at the
end of the audio stream, and the output yˆia is incorporated in the
cross-entropy loss for the audio modality.
3.4 Loss functions
Inspired by [3], we use contrastive loss as the key component of the
objective function. Contrastive loss enables maximization of the dis-
similarity score for manipulated video sequences, while minimizing
the MDS for real videos. This consequently ensures separability of
the real and fake videos based on MDS (see Fig. 2). The loss function
is represented by Equation 1. Here, yi is the label for video vi and
margin is a hyper-parameter. Dissimilarity scoredit , is the Euclidean
distance between the (segment-based) feature representations fv
and fa of the visual and audio streams respectively.
In addition, we employ the cross-entropy loss for the visual and
audio streams to learn feature representations in a robust manner.
These loss functions are defined in Equations 3 (visual) and 4 (audio).
The overall loss L is a weighted sum of these three losses, L1,L2
and L3 as in Eq. 5.
L1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi ) (dit )2 + (1 − yi )max(marдin − dit , 0)2 (1)
dit = ∥ fv − fa ∥2 (2)
L2 = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi log yˆiv + (1 − yi ) log (1 − yˆiv ) (3)
L3 = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi log yˆia + (1 − yi ) log (1 − yˆia ) (4)
L = λ1L1 + λ2L2 + λ3L3 (5)
where λ1, λ2, λ3 = 1 in our design.
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Table 1: Structure of the audio and visual streams (initial lay-
ers of the visual stream are the same as in the 3D ResNet
architecture [10]).
Visual Stream Audio Stream
conv1
conv_1, 3×3, 1, 64
batch_norm_1, 64
pool_1, 1×1, MaxPool
conv2_x
conv_2, 3×3, 64, 192
batch_norm_2, 192
pool_2, 3×3, MaxPool
conv3_x conv_3, 3×3, 192, 384
batch_norm_3, 384
conv4_x conv_4, 3×3, 384, 256
batch_norm_4, 256
conv5_x
conv_5, 3×3, 256, 256
batch_norm_5, 256
pool_5, 3×3, MaxPool
average pool conv_6, 5×4, 256, 512
batch_norm_6, 512
fc7, 256×7×7, 4096 fc7, 512×21, 4096
batch_norm_7, 4096 batch_norm_7, 4096
fc8, 4096, 1024 fc8, 4096, 1024
batch_norm_8, 1024 batch_norm_8, 1024
dropout, p = 0.5 dropout, p = 0.5
fc10, 1024, 2 fc10, 1024, 2
3.5 Test Inference
During test inference, the visual segments {si1, si2, ..., sin } and cor-
responding audio segments {ai1,ai2, ...,ain } of a video are passed
through Sv and Sa , respectively. For each such segment, dissimi-
larity score dit (Equation 2) is accumulated to compute the MDS as
below:
MDSi =
1
n
n∑
t=1
dit (6)
To label the test video, we compareMDSi with a threshold τ using
1{MDSi < τ } where 1{.} denotes the logical indicator function. τ is
determined on the training set. We compute MDS for both real and
fake videos of the train set, and the midpoint between the average
values for the real and fake videos is used as a representative value
for τ .
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Dataset Description
As our method is multimodal, we use two public audio-visual deep-
fake datasets in our experiments. Their description is as follows:
Deepfake-TIMIT [11]: This dataset contains videos of 16 sim-
ilar looking pairs of people, which are manually selected from the
publicly available VIDTIMIT [21] database and manipulated using
an open-source GAN-based3 approach. There are two different mod-
els for generating fake videos, one Low Quality (LQ), with 64 × 64
input/output size, and the other High Quality (HQ), with 128 × 128
input/output size. Each of the 32 subjects has 10 videos, resulting
in a total of 640 face swapped videos in the dataset; each video is
of 512 × 384 resolution with 25 fps frame rate, and of ≈ 4s duration.
However, the audio channel is not manipulated in any of the videos.
DFDC dataset [5]: The preview dataset, comprising of 5214 videos
was released in Oct 2019 and the complete one with 119,146 videos
in Dec 2019. Details of the manipulations have not been disclosed, in
order to represent the real adversarial space of facial manipulation.
The manipulations can be present in either audio or visual or both
of the channels. In order to bring out a fair comparison, we used
18,000 videos4 in our experiments. The videos are of ≈ 10s duration
each with an fps of 30, so there are ≈ 300 frames per video.
3https://github.com/shaoanlu/faceswap-GAN
4Same as the videos used in [16].
Figure 2: Effect of loss functions: The graphs show the effect
of audio and visual cross-entropy loss functions (Section 4.3).
The top and bottom graphs show the MDS distribution for
test samples, when the contrastive loss L1 alone and com-
bined losses L are used in the training of the MDS network,
respectively.
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4.2 Training Parameters
For both the datasets, we used D = 1 second segment duration and
the margin hyper-parameter described in Equation 1 was set to
0.99. This resulted in (3 x 30 x 224 x 224) dimensional input for the
visual stream in case of DFDC dataset and for the other dataset,
Deepfake-TIMIT, the input dimension to the visual stream was (3
x 25 x 224 x 224). On DFDC we trained our model for 100 epochs
with a batch size of 8 whereas for Deepfake-TIMIT the model only
required 50 epochs with 16 batch size for convergence as the dataset
size was small. We used Adam optimizer with a learning rate of
0.001 and all the results were generated on Nvidia Titan RTX GPU
with 32 GB system RAM. For the evaluation, we use video-wise
Area Under the Curve (AUC) metric.
4.3 Ablation Studies
To decide the structure of the network and effect of different com-
ponents, we chose 5800 videos (4000 real and 1800 fake) from the
DFDC dataset, divided them into an 85:15 train-test split and con-
ducted the following experiments:
Effect of Loss Functions: We evaluated the contribution of the
audio and visual streams based cross-entropy loss functions (L2
and L3, respectively). The hypothesis behind adding these two loss
functions to the network is that the feature representations learnt
across the audio and visual streams, respectively will be more dis-
criminative towards the task of deep fake detection. This should
further assist in the task of computing a segment dissimilarity score
dit , which disambiguates between fake and real videos. This hypoth-
esis was tested by training the network on the DFDC dataset in two
different settings. The first setting is based on training the MDS net-
work with contrastive loss only. The second setting is combination
of the three loss functions for training of the MDS network. Figure
2 shows two graphs generated using the MDS scores as predicted
by the networks from the two settings above. It is observed that the
distributions of real and fake videos have lesser intersection in the
case of the network trained with all three losses. Overall, combined
loss function and contrastive loss only based networks achieved
92.7% and 86.1% AUC scores.
The difference attributes to the observation that the gap between
average MDS for real and fake videos widens when cross-entropy
loss functions are also used. Hence, there is more clear distinction
between the dissonance scores for real and fake.
Audio and Visual Stream Performance:We analysed the in-
dividual discriminative ability to identify fake and real videos for
the audio and the visual streams. In this case the cross-entropy
loss alone was used for training of the streams. It was observed
that the audio stream only and visual stream only based deepfake
classifiers achieved 50.0 and 89.7%, respectively. Note that audio
stream achieves less performance as in the DFDC dataset, minimal
manipulation is performed on the audio signal of the videos.
In Equation 6, for the four configurations: audio stream only,
contrastive loss only, visual stream only and combined loss, we set
the parameters as follows: (λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 1), (λ1 = 1, λ2 =
0, λ3 = 0), (λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1, λ3 = 0) and (λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, λ3 = 1). In
the case of audio stream and visual stream based classification, the
cross-entropy generated real and fake probabilities are generated
Figure 3: Discriminative-ability of individual streams: The
graphs show the distribution of the mean L2 distance, when
a fake segment and corresponding real segment are passed
through only the audio and visual streams.
segment-wise. We compute a maximum over the probabilities to
compute the final fake and real for these two streams, individually.
For further assessing the audio and visual stream’s individual
performances, we generated the plots shown in Figure 3. The pro-
cess is as follows: a fake video segment and corresponding real
video segment is passed through the streams and L2 distance is
computed between the output of fc8 layer of the visual/audio sub-
network. Then the average of these L2 distances for a video pair
is plotted. It is observed in the audio stream plot, that most of the
videos are centered close to 0 inter-pair L2 distance. This is due to
the fact that audio has been modified in few cases in DFDC dataset.
On the contrary, in the plot for the visual stream, we observed that
the inter-pair L2 scores is spread across the dataset. This supports
the argument that the visual stream is more discrimiantive due to
the added cross entropy loss.
In Table 3, we show the AUC of the four configurations men-
tioned above. Note that these numbers are on a smaller set of DFDC,
which is used for ablation studies only. The contrastive loss only
based configuration, which uses both the streams, achieves 86.1%.
The fusion of the cross-entropy loss into the final MDS network
(λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, λ3 = 1 for Equation 6), achieves 92.7%. This backs
up the argument that comparing (using contrastive loss) features
learned through supervised channels enhances the performance of
the MDS network.
Segment Duration: For deciding the optimal length of the tem-
poral segment D, we conducted empirical analysis with temporal
sizes of D = [1, 2, 4] seconds. From the evaluation on the DFDC
dataset, we observed that the temporal duration D = 1 second is
most optimum. This can attributed to the larger number of segments
Figure 4: Grad-CAM results: Three frames are overlayed
with the important attention regions highlighted using
Grad-CAM.Note that forehead, face region andneck regions
are highlighted in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd frames respectively.
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Table 2: Comparison of our method with other techniques on DFDC and DFTIMIT datasets using the AUCmetric. Here, DFDC
is the larger dataset with 18K samples and DFTIMIT contains 640 samples only.
Methods
Capsule Multi-task HeadPose Two-stream VA-MLP VA-LogReg Meso4
[19] [18] [28] [30] [15] [1]
Datasets
DFDC 53.3 53.6 55.9 61.4 61.9 66.2 75.3
DFTIMIT LQ 78.4 62.2 55.1 83.5 61.4 77.0 87.8HQ 74.4 55.3 53.2 73.5 62.1 77.3 68.4
Modality V V V V V V V
Methods
Xception-raw Xception-c40 Xception-c23 FWA DSP-FWA Siamese-based Our Method
[20] [13] [16]
Datasets
DFDC 49.9 69.7 72.2 72.7 75.5 84.4 91.5 (93.5)
DFTIMIT LQ 56.7 75.8 95.9 99.9 99.9 96.3 97.9
HQ 54.0 70.5 94.4 93.2 99.7 94.9 96.8
Modality V V V V V AV AV
representing each video, thereby allowing fine-grained comparison
of the audio and the visual data of a video.
4.4 Evaluation on DFDC Dataset
We compare the performance of our method on the DFDC dataset
with other state-of-the-art works [1, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 28, 30]. A
total of 18,000 videos are used in this experiment. In Table 2, it is
observed that the MDS network approach outperforms the other
visual-only and audio-visual based approaches by achieving 91.54%.
The performance is ~8% more relatively than the other audio-visual
based approach [16]. Please note that the result 91.54% is achieved
with the test set containing 3281 videos out of which 281 videos have
two subjects each. We chose the larger face and passed it through
the visual stream. The performance of the network without these
multiple subject videos is 93.50%.
We argue that the gain in performance here is due to: (a) The
temporal segmentation of the video into segment helps in fine-
grained audio-visual feature comparison; (b) We extract task-tuned
features from the audio and visual segments. Here task-tunedmeans
that the features are learnt to discriminate between real and fake
with the L2 and L3 loss functions, and (c) The visual stream’s input
is the face and an extra margin (see Figure 1) around it, which
accounts for some rigid (head) movement along with the non-rigid
(facial) movements. We visualise the important regions using the
Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) method
[22]. Figure 4 shows the important regions localised by Grad-CAM
on few frames of a video. Note that the region around the face is
highlighted in the middle frame. Also, the forehead and the neck
regions are highlighted in the first and third frames, respectively.
Table 3: The AUC based comparison of audio stream, visual
stream, contrastive loss only and combined loss (Details in
Section 4.3).
λ1=0,λ2=0,λ3=1
Audio Stream
λ1=1,λ2=0,λ3=0
Contrastive Only
λ1=0,λ2=1,λ3=0
Visual Stream
λ1=1,λ2=1,λ3=1
Combined Loss
50.0 86.1 89.7 91.7
This supports our argument that the disharmony between the non-
rigid and rigid movement is also discriminative for the visual stream
to classify between real and fake videos.
4.5 Evaluation on DFTIMIT Dataset
The DeepFake-TIMIT (DFTIMIT) dataset is smaller as compared
to the DFDC dataset. We trained the MDS network in two res-
olution settings: LQ and HQ. Table 2 shows the comparison of
our method with the other state-of-the-art methods. It is observed
that our method achieves comparable results (LQ: 97.92% and HQ:
96.87%) with the top achieving method [13]. In the DFTIMIT test
set there are 96 videos in total. This applies that the penalty for mis-
classification towards the overall AUC is high in DFTIMIT’s case.
It is interesting to note that our method mis-classified just 3 video
samples in the HQ experiments and 2 videos in the LQ experiments.
[13] achieve state-of-the-art results (LQ: 99.9% and HQ: 99.7%) on
DFTIMIT, however, achieve relatively lower AUC results (72.7%)
on the larger dataset DFDC. In comparison our method achieved
18% more than [13] on DFDC dataset. This could also mean that
the DFTIMIT dataset is now saturated due to smaller size similar
to the popular ImageNet dataset [4].
4.6 Temporal Forgery Localization
With the advent of sophisticated forgery techniques, it is possible
that an entire video or smaller portions of the video are manipu-
lated to deceive the audience. If in case parts of the original video
are corrupted, it would be useful from the FD perspective to be
able to locate the timestamps corresponding to the corrupted seg-
ments. In an interesting work, Wu et al. [26] proposed a CNNwhich
detects forgery along with the forged locations in images. How-
ever, their method is only applicable to copy-paste image forgery.
As we process the vidseo by dividing it into temporal segments,
a fine-grained analysis of the input video is possible, thereby en-
abling forgery localization. In contrast to the MDS network, earlier
techniques [13, 16] computed features over the entire video. We
argue that if a forgery has been performed on a small segment of a
video, the forgery signatures in that segment may get diluted due
to pooling across the whole video. A similar phenomenon is also
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Figure 5: Forgery Localization results: In the two examples
above, the red part of the curve is detected as fake and blue as
real by our method. The segment of the video with segment
wise dissimilarity above the threshold is labelled as fake and
below the threshold is labelled as real. On the x-axis, wehave
the original segment labels and on the y-axis the segment-
level dissimilarity score (Section 4.6).
observed in prior work relating to pain detection and localization
[23]. As the pain event could be short and its location is not labeled,
the authors divide the video into temporal segments for better pain
detection.
Most of the datasets, including the ones used in this paper have
data manipulation performed on practically the entire video. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for forgery localization
in fake videos, we joined segments from real and corresponding
fake videos of the same subject at random locations. In Figure 5, we
show the outputs on two videos created by mixing video segments
of the same subject from the DFDC dataset. Here, the segment-wise
score is shown on the y-axis. The segments for which the score is
above a threshold are assigned as being fake (red on the curve) and
below the threshold (blue color on the curve) are assigned are real.
In addition to Figs. 4 and 2, forgery localization makes the working
of the MDS-based fake detection framework more explainable and
interpretable.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We propose a novel bimodal deepfake detection approach based
on the modality dissonance score (MDS), which captures the sim-
ilarity between audio and visual streams for real and fake videos
thereby facilitating separability. The MDS is modeled via the con-
trastive loss computed over segment-level audiovisual features,
which constrains genuine audio-visual streams to be closer than
fake counterparts. Furthermore, cross-entropy loss is enforced on
the unimodal streams to ensure that they independently learn dis-
criminative features. Experiments show that (a) the MDS-based FD
framework can achieve state-of-the-art performance on the DFDC
dataset, and (b) the unimodal cross-entropy losses provide extra
benefit on top of the contrastive loss to enhance FD performance.
Explainability and interpretability of the proposed approach are
demonstrated via audio-visual distance distributions obtained for
real and fake videos, Grad-CAM outputs denoting attention regions
of the MDS network, and forgery localization results.
Future work would focus on (a) incorporating human assess-
ments (acquired via EEG and eye-gaze sensing) in addition to con-
tent analysis adopted in this work; (b) exploring algorithms such as
multiple instance learning for transient forgery detection, and (c)
achieving real-time forgery detection (accomplished by online in-
trusions) given the promise of processing audio-visual information
over 1-second segments.
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